In the U.S. and Europe, prices change between every six months and once a year. Yet nominal macro shocks seem to have real effects lasting well beyond a year. "Sticky information" models, as posited by Mankiw and Reis (2002) , Sims (2003) , and Woodford (2003), can reconcile micro flexibility with macro rigidity. We simulate a sticky information model in which price setters do not update their information on macro shocks as often as they update their information on micro shocks. Compared to a standard menu cost model, price changes in this model reflect older macro shocks. We then examine price changes in the micro data underlying the U.S. CPI. We find that empirical price changes react to information up to a year old, consistent with the sticky information hypothesis. In this test we use all price changes, including those related to "sales" and "substitutions" (product turnover) because we find such price changes reflect macro information rather than being purely idiosyncratic.
Introduction
Individual consumer and producer prices change every six months to a year. See Bils and Klenow (2004) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2006) for U.S. evidence, and Dhyne, Alvarez, Bihan, Veronese, Dias, Hoffman, Jonker, Lunnermann, Rumler and Vilmunen (2005) for studies of Euro Area countries. In contrast, many studies find that nominal macro shocks have real effects with a half-life well over a year. See, for example, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999) , Romer and Romer (2003) , and Bernanke, Boivin and Eliasz (2004) .
"Sticky information" theories can reconcile macro price rigidity with micro price flexibility.
1 These theories, advanced recently by Sims (1998 Sims ( , 2003 , Mankiw and Reis (2002, 2006) , and Woodford (2003) , feature imperfect information about macro shocks. As a result, many rounds of micro price changes are needed to fully reflect a given macro shock. In versions such as Sims', the micro flexibility is at the expense of macro flexibility, as firms face convex costs of processing information.
We aim is to explore whether the tell-tale predictions of sticky information models are borne out in data on micro price changes. Specifically, do price changes reflect dated information on macro states? Given the lack of consensus on a measure of monetary policy shocks, especially one that explains inflation movements well, this is not a straightforward task. We therefore simulate simple GE models to derive responses of price changes to past inflation movements.
The models we simulate feature exogenous money growth, a cash-in-advance constraint, and monopolistically competitive firms. The firms face idiosyncratic productivity shocks as well as the aggregate money shocks, but do not change prices every period because they face costs of implementing price changes (i.e., menu costs). We model sticky nominal prices alongside sticky information for two reasons. First, 80-90% of prices do not change in the typical month, an important fact for a monetary business cycle model to match. Second, we exploit the lumpiness of price changes to test for sticky information. When a firm changes its price, we ask, does the change reflect only inflation innovations since their last price change, or does it put weight on older innovations?
As a benchmark, we first consider a model with flexible information (i.e., constant updating on macro states). We then introduce staggered updating of information on macro states a la Taylor. This model is closest to Mankiw-Reis in having periodic full updating of macro information. It shares some of the spirit of Sims, however, in having firms observe their idiosyncratic shocks every period. As expected, the less frequent the updating of macro information in the model, the more persistent the real output effects of money shocks. And the stickier the information, the more individual price changes reflect old inflation innovations as opposed to recent ones.
We choose several model parameters to match moments in the CPI Research Database maintained by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. We choose the mean, standard deviation and serial correlation of money growth in the model to approximate the mean, standard deviation and serial correlation of inflation in the data. We choose the size of menu costs and the size of idiosyncratic productivity shocks to match the frequency and size of micro price changes in the data.
Our test is then whether the price changes in the data respond to old inflation innovations, or only those arriving since the firm last changed its price. In the data, we find evidence that price changes reflect macro inflation innovations up to year older than they should according to our flexible information model. Our empirical regressions look more like those we obtain from our sticky information models than those we get from our flexible information model.
We also use the test to examine whether specific types of price changes reflect macro information or, instead, purely idiosyncratic forces. The BLS labels each price as either a "sale" price or a "regular" price, and also keeps track of when products turn over ("substitutions") . Price changes related to sales and substitutions are often filtered out of price data by macro researchers (e.g., Golosov and Lucas (2007) , and Nakamura and Steinsson (2006) ) on the grounds that they may reflect idiosyncratic considerations rather than macroeconomic information. We find that sales-and substitution-related price changes respond to macro information in much the same way that regular price changes do, suggesting they should not be dropped from the data in macro studies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we lay out the general equilibrium models featuring sticky prices (due to menu costs) and exogenously sticky information.
In section 3 we describe the CPI micro dataset, and report statistics that we use to set parameter values in our models. In section 4 we compare the price changes produced by the models to those in the CPI microdata. In section 5 we offer conclusions.
Model
To investigate the role of sticky information in the micro data, we construct a model with several key features. The basic structure of the model follows from Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) . Households consume a wide variety of goods with a constant elasticity of substitution between them. Monopolistically competitive firms produce goods to meet demand at their posted prices. To generate a motive for holding money, we assume that households must pay for their consumption goods in cash before receiving their income. In order to generate the nominal price rigidities observed in the data, firms face a "menu" cost of implementing a price change. To examine the role of sticky information, we assume that information on macro variables (exogenous and endogenous) arrives in staggered fashion. By changing the frequency of information arrival we can investigate different degrees of information stickiness.
Finally, we assume that firms use a boundedly rational forecast for inflation. This assumption allows us to obtain a solution to the model with a finite state space.
Households
Households consume a variety of m goods and provide labor for production of the goods.
Their choices are made to maximize
where the consumption good, C t , represents an aggregation of individual goods according to the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator with a constant elasticity of substitution θ:
Households make their spending decisions at the beginning of the period before receiving their income, and we assume that their purchases must be paid for out of money holdings, M t . Money holdings can be used to purchase consumption goods and real bonds, B t :
Real bonds are priced by the cost of purchasing a unit of the aggregate consumption good, which is given by
Households receive income at the end of the period in the form of money. Income consists of wages earned by working for firms at a per-period wage rate of W t , profits from their ownership of firms, Π t , real returns from bond holdings, r t , and lump sum transfers of money from the central bank, X t+1 . 2 Income earned in period t provides the money holdings used for consumption in period t + 1:
The household budget constraint specifies that money spent on purchases in the current period not exceed money income earned in the previous period. Combining (3) and (5):
The solution to the household's optimization decision provides the demand function, real interest rate, and wage rate that will be used by firms in their dynamic programming problem. Since the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution in consumption is equal to 1 for households, the real interest rate is constant, r = 1−β β . The first order condition for consumption of the differentiated goods can be transformed into the following demand function for good C i,t relative to good C k,t :
Households are indifferent between consuming today and saving for consumption in the next period (in the form of bonds). We solve for an equilibrium in which households spend all money holdings on consumption in the current period, as bonds are in zero net supply.
Using the cash-in-advance constraint, the demand for a differentiated good can be expressed as a function of real money balances:
Finally, using the households' labor supply decision, we derive an expected real wage that is constant. Since wage income earned today is not spent until the following period, households equate the marginal disutility of labor with the discounted expected marginal utility of consumption produced by marginal income earned from working today:
Rearranging this condition, we can solve for the real wage in the current period as a function of the expected change in the price level:
Firms
In the economy, there are m monopolistically competitive firms. Each firm produces a differentiated good, Y i , using labor input, L i . Firms are assumed to meet all demand at a given price, implying that Y i = C i .
Contemporaneous real profits for firm i are given by
where P i is the price for good i. The firm faces the demand function given by (8), the real wage given by (10), and the production function
Here Z i is an idiosyncratic productivity shock, and η governs returns to scale of production, allowing for decreasing returns due to a fixed factor of production.
After substituting in the demand, real wage, and production functions, we arrive at the real profit function
where κ = ϕ β .
Price adjustment cost
In order to generate nominal price rigidity, we assume that firms must pay a cost, ψ, in order to implement a price change. This cost is the same for all firms and in all periods and is expressed as a fraction of revenue in the steady-state symmetric equilibrium, where steady-state (ss) revenue for all firms is R ss ≡ M P ss
. If firm i chooses to change its price in the current period, then net contemporaneous profits, Π C i , will be
Information cost
To explore the implications of sticky information, we assume information regarding macro state variables arrives in a staggered fashion. If new information does not arrive in the current period, we assume the firm is not able to determine anything about the current innovation to money growth. This requires that pricing managers not interact with the production managers or accountants within the firm, otherwise they could see production or profits and draw inferences about current money innovations. We make this assumption to keep the model tractable and to present the starkest implications of sticky information.
The assumption could potentially be relaxed by adding measurement error to the model. Letn A be the number of periods between observing the aggregate money growth rate, inflation rate, and real money supply. For a given firm in a given period, let n A represent the number of periods since aggregate information was last observed, i.e., the age of aggregate information. If a firm has updated information, then n A = 0. Similarly, let n I represent the age of idiosyncratic information. We set n I =0 so firms always have current information on their idiosyncratic productivity shock. This is in the spirit of Sims' rational inattention story, wherein firms pay more attention to idiosyncratic than aggregate shocks because the former are much larger.
Dynamic Optimization
Given the presence of an implementation cost of a price change, the firm solves a dynamic optimization problem to maximize profits. In each period the firm decides whether or not to adjust its price. If it decides to adjust, it pays the implementation cost and resets its price. If it does not adjust, its nominal price remains fixed, and its relative price, p i =
decreases at the rate of inflation.
The state variables of the firm's optimization problem are impacted by the timing of information updating. The seven state variables are the firm's current nominal price relative to the aggregate price level the last time aggregate information was observed (p i,−n A ), the money growth rate when last observed (g M,−n A ), the inflation rate when last observed (π −n A ), the level of real money balances when last observed m −n A ≡ M P −n A , the idiosyncratic productivity index (Z i ), the age of aggregate information (n A ), and the information set Ω used to form future expectations of the endogenous state variables.
Given the state vector, S = {p i,−n A , g M,−n A , π −n A , m −n A , Z i , n A , Ω}, the firm maximizes the following value function:
where V C (S) represents the firm's value conditional on changing its price and V N C (S) its value conditional on not changing its price. The value of a price change is expressed as
with
by β, reflecting the household's real interest rate.
In order to solve this optimization problem, the firm must be able to form expectations over the state variables. In periods in which current information is not observed, the firm computes expected profits conditional on the most recent information they have on the state variables. For example, to form an expectation of the current relative price, p i , the firm takes the current nominal price relative to the price level n A periods ago, p i,−n A , and integrates over all of the possible sequences of inflation over n A periods conditional on information in the state vector. Regardless of the age of the information, the firm will always need to take conditional expectations of the future value function. The firm chooses the nominal price relative to the price level n A periods ago,
, that generates the highest expected value.
The value conditional on no price change is expressed as
For the exogenous state variables, money growth and idiosyncratic productivity, we assume autoregressive processes:
Bounded rationality
In order to compute a fully rational expectation of inflation, a firm needs to know the state variables of all firms in the economy, including the joint distribution of relative prices and idiosyncratic productivity shocks. One way to solve this model would be to introduce restrictions that reduce the heterogeneity to a manageable scope, as in Dotsey, King and Wolman (1999) , hereafter DKW. An alternative solution is to assume that firms form inflation expectations based on a limited set of information. We choose the latter solution method for two reasons. First, the heterogeneity restrictions required for the DKW model do not match up well with the micro evidence. 3 Second, due to the heterogeneity introduced by staggered updating of information, assuming bounded rationality helps keep the model tractable.
We assume firms use the following linear forecasting rule to form expectations of inflation:
where ν π,t is the forecast error. Firms will use their inflation forecast along with their forecast of money growth, from (18), to come up with a forecast for real money balances, ln m
The dynamic system used for forming aggregate expectations can be expressed as a 3 See Klenow and Kryvtsov (2005) and Willis (2000).
three-variable autoregressive VAR:
With a little manipulation, we can convert (20), (21), and (18) into the VAR system
The equilibrium solution of the model requires the selection of an appropriate inflation forecast rule, Θ = {α 1 , α 2 , α 3 }. Using this forecast rule, the firm will solve the optimization problem in (15) by determining a policy function for the updating of prices:
The recursive equilibrium of the model consists of the functions V and f along with the inflation forecast rule, Θ, such that (i) V and f solve the firm's optimization problem and (ii) the expected inflation dynamics from the forecast rule matches the actual inflation dynamics resulting from firms' pricing decisions in model simulations.
Calibration and Simulation
Due to the presence of a discrete-choice decision in the optimization problem expressed in (15), the model is solved numerically using value function iteration. In this solution, all state variables are placed on discrete grids. The bounds of the relative price state are set wide enough to include all optimal pricing decisions, and prices are placed on the grid in autoregressive process for idiosyncratic productivity is transformed into a discrete-valued Markov chain following Tauchen (1986) . 4 This conversion provides us with the transition matrix expressing the expected probability of any given realization of Z t+1 as a function of the current state variables Z t . The three-variable VAR for inflation, real money balances, and money growth is similarly converted into a first-order Markov chain. 5 These transition matrices are used to compute the discounted expected value of the future period as well as expected contemporaneous profits if firms have out-of-date information. Another transition
, provides the probability of moving from information of age n A in the current period to information of age n ′ A next period. The parametrization of this matrix will determine the stickiness of macro information. Table 1 displays the parameter values we use in our model simulations. We calibrate some structural parameters based on information other than the BLS price data, and some based on the BLS price data. We use a bimonthly frequency (six periods per year) for the model to match the sampling frequency in the BLS microdata. We set the discount rate, β, to 0.993 (=0.96 1 6 ), to arrive at a 4% annual real interest rate. We set the elasticity of substitution between different consumer goods, θ, to 5, corresponding to a 25 percent markup for the firm. This is at the intersection of values used in the IO (3-5) and macro (5-10) literatures.
We set returns to scale in production, η, to 0.9. This is a compromise between the more conventional constant returns and labor's share of around 0.7, as we have only labor in the model. We set κ, the marginal disutility of labor divided by the discount rate, to 0.5. The results of interest from the model are not sensitive to changing κ.
We set the remaining parameter values based on statistics calculated with the BLS price data, which we discuss in more detail in the next full section. We set the parameters of the 4 The discrete grid for idiosyncratic productivity contains 5 points spread equally in terms of the cumulative distribution function of the variable.
5 The discrete grids for inflation, real money balances, and money growth contain 11, 7, and 5 points, respectively, spread equally in terms of the cumulative distribution function of the variables. money growth process, µ gM , ρ gM and σ gM , to produce inflation dynamics similar to the data.
A random walk for money (ρ gM = 0) turns out to be the closest we can come to mimicking the low persistence of inflation in the data. Values of µ gM = 0.0038 and σ gM = 0.013 allow us to closely match the mean and standard deviation of actual inflation. We base the persistence of the idiosyncratic productivity shock, ρ Z , on estimates in Klenow and Willis (2006) . In that study we looked at the persistence of relative prices within categories of consumption, thereby controlling for different industry price trends (e.g., computers vs. medical care).
Translating our monthly serial correlation of 0.68 to our bimonthly frequency here results in ρ Z =0.46. Midrigan (2006) and Golosov and Lucas (2007) use similar values based on grocery scanner data and BLS data, respectively. Finally, we base σ Z , on the absolute size of price changes in the BLS data. Our value of σ Z =0.083 is likewise similar to values used in Klenow and Willis (2006) , Midrigan (2006) , and Golosov and Lucas (2007) . Finally, we set the cost of implementing price changes, ψ, to 1.3% of firm revenue. Combined with the other parameter values, this enables us to match the frequency of price changes observed in the data of 30% per bimonth.
Following Willis (2003) , the inflation forecasting rule expressed in (20) is used to compute a rational expectations equilibrium of the model. For a given specification of the structural parameters of the model along with the inflation forecasting parameters, Θ = {α 1 , α 2 , α 3 }, the model is solved and the policy function is generated. A panel of 6,000 firms over 500 periods (bimonths) is then simulated using the policy functions.
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Simulating data from the model requires an updating process to determine the evolution of the endogenous aggregate-level state variables. The aggregate inflation rate and the level of real money balances are determined by the collective actions of firms in the simulation. 6 The size of the panel was chosen as follows. First, the cross-section should have a large number of firms given the 80,000+ price observations per period in the BLS data. We found increasing the number of firms above 6,000 did not alter the results in any significant fashion. Second, the number of periods should yield close to "asymptotic" results. We found that lengthening the sample beyond 500 did not materially affect the simulated moments. Below we do not report standard errors from regressions based on simulated data, as they are quite small given our large panels.
When setting prices in the current period, firms with updated information, n A = 0, possess the current values of inflation and real money balances. To determine the current-period inflation rate while simulating the model, which in turn determines the level of real money balances using equation (21), we locate the grid point in the inflation state space that most closely matches equation (4), where the inflation rate is combined with P −1 to get P .
After simulating the full panel, we evaluate the inflation forecasting rule. An OLS regression of the forecasting rule in (20) 
Sticky Information
The setting forn A provides the interval between updates of information. The updating across firms will be staggered so that a constant fraction of firms receive new information each period. To illustrate the consequences of information stickiness, we will consider four cases corresponding to the maximum age of aggregate information ranging from 0 to 3 periods:n A ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}.
We assume firms always have current information on their idiosyncratic shocks (n I = 0). This assumption allows us to focus on the implications of aggregate information stickiness.
To illustrate the role of sticky information, Figures 1 and 2 display responses of inflation and real output to a 1 percent shock to money growth. As shown in Figure 1 , an increase in information stickiness leads to a delayed, hump-shaped response of inflation. The delayed inflation response suggests that there will be a stronger output response for sticky information models than for the baseline model. This pattern is clearly observed in Figure 2 .
Each of the four cases has a different equilibrium inflation process and hence different parameters values in the forecast rule (20). The parameters for each case are displayed in Table 2a . The coefficients vary modestly, but the rule's explanatory power is enhanced by sticky information as it makes inflation more persistent. 
Old information
As an alternative model of information stickiness, we also consider an economy in which all firms have equally old information. This assumption approximates a model in which information processing costs are such that it takes firms several periods to discern an aggregate shock. In our model, this would be represented as a case where firms always have aggregate information that isn A periods old.
As before, we will consider four different information assumptions. In the baseline model, firms always have current information. In the second case, firms always have aggregate information that is 1 period old. This differs from the previous model in that firms are now restricted so that they never possess current aggregate information, whereas in the sticky information model, half of firms possess current information and half possess information that is 1 period old. We also consider cases in which information is 2 and 3 periods old, respectively. Table 2b displays the equilibrium inflation forecast parameters. All of the coefficients change with the age of information, and the explanatory power of this equation on simulated data is strongest when information is 1 period old. This makes intuitive sense as the forecast rule only contains information lagged one period, and it suggests additional information lags should be added to the cases with older information. However, since each additional lagged variable becomes a state variable for the optimization problem, we cannot maintain tractability of the solution with an expanded forecast rule. The BLS collects prices monthly for food and energy items in all areas, and monthly for all items in New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago. For other areas, they check prices bimonthly for "core" items (items other than food or energy). Each bimonthly item is either odd (checked in months 1=January, 3=March, 5=May, 7=July, 9=September and 11=November) or even (checked in months 2=February, 4=April, 6=June, 8=August, 10=October, and 12=December). To use all items from all areas, and yet have a single frequency, we construct a bimonthly dataset. We label half the monthly items odds and half evens, and follow their odd or even prices accordingly. The disadvantage is that we are ignoring half the price quotes for monthly items. Yet in so doing we incorporate the 80,000 items coming from all areas.
If we were to stick with a monthly dataset, in contrast, we would have only around 14,000
items from the top three cities. Just as important, looking at bimonths rather than months allows us to consider models with greater stickiness of information without adding as many states (e.g., three bimonths as opposed to six months).
To pin down key parameters in our model, we calculate five statistics from the CPI data.
Three are the mean, standard deviation, and serial correlation of the aggregate bimonthly inflation rate. In terms of our model, these can be thought of as helpful for setting the mean, standard deviation, and serial correlation of money growth. The other two statistics are the median frequency of price changes and the median size of price changes. These two moments guide our choices for the size of menu costs and the size of idiosyncratic productivity shocks.
To define the statistics, let P sit denote the price of item i in sector s in bimonth t, and ω sit the BLS weight on item i within category s in bimonth t. The weights in sector s sum to ω 95 s in every bimonth, the BLS consumption expenditure weight of category s in 1995 (which themselves sum to 1). We then define the aggregate inflation rate in bimonth t to be
When we calculate model moments for inflation, we use this geometric mean inflation.
We then take the simple average across the 101 bimonths from 1988 through 2004 to arrive at 0.384% per bimonth (2.3% per year) for inflation:
In similar fashion we calculate the standard deviation (0.397%) and serial correlation (0.170) of the inflation rate:
Our fourth moment is the fraction of items changing price from one bimonth to the next.
Let I(∆P sit = 0) be a price-change indicator for item i in sector s in bimonth t. It is 1 if the item changed price from bimonth t − 1 to t, and 0 otherwise. We calculate the mean of this indicator for an item, then take the weighted median value across items to arrive at 0.300 (30.0% per bimonth). Easier to express explicitly is the cousin of this statistic, the weighted mean frequency of price changes, which is higher at 38.0%:
Here ω si = t ω sit . We prefer the median to the mean because, in time-dependent models at least, the median appears to better approximate a model with heterogeneity. Bils and Klenow (2004) examine this for the Taylor model, and Carvalho (2006) for the Calvo model.
Our final moment is the weighted median absolute size of price changes, which is 0.0853 (8.53%). Again, it is easier to explicitly define the weighted mean, which is higher at 12.0%:
As stressed by Klenow and Kryvtsov (2005) and Golosov and Lucas (2007) , absolute price changes are much larger than needed to keep up with the trend inflation rate. The trend is about 0.4% per bimonth and the frequency of price changes is around 1/3, so price changes only need average about 1.2% to keep up with trend inflation. Yet the average price change is an order of magnitude larger at 12%. These large price changes do not merely reflect different sectoral mean inflation rates, as Klenow and Kryvtsov report large price movements even relative to a sectoral price index defined for around 300 separate categories of consumption. Given the relative stability of the aggregate inflation rate, idiosyncratic shocks will need to be large to generate such price changes in our model. Such idiosyncratic shocks will dominate individual firm decisions about when and how much to change prices, with aggregate conditions of much less importance.
In Table 3 we summarize these moments. Klenow and Willis (2006) report small bootstrapped standard errors for similar statistics, reflecting the large number of observations underlying them (about 8 million prices and 3 million price changes). We also give the corresponding moments in our baseline model. We chose the parameter values in our baseline model to try to match these moments. As can be seen, the match is close except for the serial correlation of inflation. Even without sticky information and with iid money growth, sticky prices generate more persistent inflation than observed in the data. Making money growth negatively correlated over time actually increases the serial correlation of model inflation, so
iid money growth produces the closest serial correlation to the low level in the data.
Simulation and Estimation
We now devise a test to empirically discriminate flexible and sticky information. To do so, we first express firm price changes as a function of variables in the information set for the "null" flexible information model.
Conditional on a fully-informed firm choosing to adjust its price, the Euler equation for the price decision is expressed as
where ϑ is the probability of a firm changing its price. Here we make a simplifying assumption that the probability of price adjustment is independent of the time since the previous change. This assumption matches the flat hazard rate found in the micro data by Klenow and Kryvtsov (2005) . It also is a reasonable approximation of the hazard function in the model because the volatility of idiosyncratic shocks dominates the small, but increasing, incentive to adjust due to the upward drift in the nominal money supply.
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Iterating forward on the Euler equation and assuming all prices last at most J periods:
where the derivative of the profit function is expressed as
We can then solve (27) for the optimal price:
. (29) Following DKW, we take a total derivative of the optimal pricing equation to show the determinants of an observed price change in the model:
Here
. For sufficiently low steady state inflation, such as in our model, ρ j can be approximated by ρ j =
h and ζ j is approximately zero.
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The difficulty in using (30) to test the responsiveness of price changes to new versus old information is that, in the BLS data, we only observe price changes and inflation. We do not observe any disaggregate information nor do we have a good sense of what constitutes an aggregate nominal shock for the economy. We would like to use an estimated process for to reveal the presence of sticky information even if such selection operates. We will check this by running our test on simulated data from state dependent pricing models. 10 See the derivation in DKW.
exogenous monetary and/or technology shocks, and then test to see how long it takes prices to fully respond to those shocks. Such shocks are difficult to consider, however, because there is no consensus on how best to identify them. Moreover, existing identification strategies have had more success replicating empirical output dynamics than inflation dynamics.
As an alternative, we focus on the change in price one would expect based on current information about past inflation alone. A drawback is that we will be ignoring all other aggregate variables to which firms may be responding. Ignoring the idiosyncratic information should not be as problematic because we will be using a large panel of observations in which idiosyncratic shocks should wash out (the selection effect being an important caveat here).
Given that we observe prices fixed over discrete intervals, we modify (30) to explain the observed size of a price change in period t when the price was last adjusted τ periods ago:
where Ξ i,t contains the additional terms in (30) corresponding to real money balances and the idiosyncratic productivity shock.
Since inflation is the only aggregate variable we can use in the actual data, we do not use the firms' forecast rule from the model to evaluate expected changes in the price level in the simulated data. 11 Instead, we search for an ARMA(p,q) specification that best captures inflation dynamics in the baseline model. We find that an MA(4) specification maximizes the adjusted R 2 . This implies that ln P dynamics are expressed by Table 4 presents the moving average coefficients in the data and in the baseline model. Note that we estimate an MA(4) process in the data as well as in the model. An MA(7) actually fits better in the data, but this could reflect precisely the sticky information we wish to test for. Rather than incorporate such lagged information into the "flexible information"
predicted price change, we maintained the same order MA(4) in the data as in the model.
With this specification for price-level dynamics, we can evaluate (31) as
where ∆ τ i,t ǫ t ≡ ǫ t − ǫ t−τ i,t . The MA terms affect price changes because they help forecast inflation. Price setters wish to respond to forecastable movements in the aggregate price level over the life of a price.
To simplify, define P P C i,t as the predicted price change due to new information on the aggregate price level since the previous change τ i,t periods ago:
Evaluating this expression using the the estimated MA(4) for inflation for each case of the model, we run the following regression on the simulated data:
To reiterate, this specification estimates how price changes respond to inflation that has accumulated since the previous change τ i,t periods ago. In the baseline model, wherein firms always have current information on the aggregate state variables, we expect an estimate of γ = 1 if the omitted terms from equation (30) are uncorrelated with inflation information.
This test has a close antecedent in Reis (forthcoming), who regressed consumption growth on income innovations and showed that the coefficient falls as information becomes stickier.
The estimates from four model cases are displayed in Table 5a . 
Estimation results for four cases are displayed in Table 6a . In the baseline case, where all firms have current information, the coefficients on lagged innovations are small and often negative, indicating that firms are not putting a lot of weight on old information. However, as the amount of information stickiness is increased in cases Sticky 1 through Sticky 3, we find that the λ coefficients steadily increase. This is true only for the three information lags, corresponding to the degree of information stickiness in each case. If we simulated older information, however, we would presumably see additional lags attracting higher coefficients.
The final row of Table 6a displays estimates from the BLS data. Here we find some very positive and significant coefficients on the old information terms. Five of the six appear economically and statistically significant when compared to the baseline vs. sticky info model predictions. These results provide evidence consistent with information up to a year old.
The results for the alternative model with old information are displayed in Table 6b . The pattern is not as clear: the old information coefficients are not as significant, and do not increase steadily with the degree of information stickiness. The empirical results, therefore, appear more in line with staggered information than with uniformly old information.
We end by testing whether certain types of price changes exhibit an extreme form of sticky information: namely, that they reflect no macro information at all. We first consider regular price changes vs. sale-related price changes. Golosov and Lucas (2007) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2006) focus on regular price changes, i.e., those excluding temporary price discounts. Their rationale is that sales may follow a sticky plan (e.g., 10% off Cheerios the first weekend of every month). In our context, such sales should be purely idiosyncratic and unconnected from aggregate inflation. To test this hypothesis, we split the sample of price changes into those involving only regular prices (both the old and new prices are "regular" prices according to the BLS) and those involving a sales price (either the old and/or the new price is a "sale" price according to the BLS). In this breakdown, about 1 million of the roughly 3 million price changes are sales-related. As many sales are temporary, sale-related price changes might be negatively correlated with inflation since the last price change by construction. We therefore add a"down" dummy for regular-to-sale price changes and an "up" dummy for sale-to-regular price changes: Table 7 presents the results. For the full sample the dummies have the expected sign and improve the fit dramatically. Their inclusion more than doubles the coefficient on the predicted price change to about 1.3. When we look at regular price changes alone (those not involving sales prices), the coefficient is a shade below 1. For sale-related price changes, the down and up dummies are helpful as expected. But, perhaps surprisingly, the coefficient on macro information is over 1.8. Thus it appears that sales are at least as responsive to recent inflation as are regular price changes. Since sales tend to be temporary, the upshot is that their declines are not as deep and they give way to higher regular prices when recent inflation has been high. These results appear to undermine the hypothesis that sales do not reflect recent information on the aggregate price level.
Finally, we split the sample of price changes into those related to product turnover, or "substitutions" in the BLS vernacular, and those involving precisely the same product.
About 7% of all price changes involve substitutions in the BLS data. Golosov and Lucas (2007) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2006) likewise filter out these price changes. The regression results are in the bottom panel of Table 7 . The same product regression looks similar to the full sample regression (1.21 for same product price changes only vs. 1.31 for all price changes). More striking, substitution-related price changes appear less related to recent inflation (0.66 at turnover vs. 1.21 within-product). This finding supports the idea that substitutions reflect some idiosyncratic or longer-range forces, rather than being responses to recent inflation. Still, substitution-related price changes are very related to macro price trends and should probably not be excluded from macro research on price stickiness.
Conclusion
Researchers are striving to develop micro foundations for apparently long-lasting real effects of nominal shocks. Nominal rigidities may be an important component, but prices do not appear to be sticky for long enough to do the job alone. Hence, Sims, Woodford and MankiwReis have formulated theories in which macro information is stickier than micro prices. In
Sims' incarnation the two are tightly related: micro shocks demand micro flexibility, thereby undercutting macro flexibility because of convex costs of processing all types of information.
In this paper we have argued that sticky information theories have testable implications for micro price changes. We use simple GE models to demonstrate that the stickier the information, the older the inflation innovations firms respond to when they change prices.
When we examine price changes in the U.S. CPI microdata, we find evidence that price changes reflect information up to a year older than predicted by a flexible information model.
In addition, we find that sale-related price changes respond to macro information at least as much as regular price changes do. This suggests that sale prices should not be filtered out of data used for analysis of macroeconomic responsiveness. More muted statements apply to substitution-related price changes, which respond very much to overall inflation, but still half as much as price changes at other times. 
